Evolution of mindsight, transparency and rule-rationality by Rtischev, Dimitry
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Evolution of mindsight, transparency and
rule-rationality
Dimitry Rtischev
10 August 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40890/
MPRA Paper No. 40890, posted 27 August 2012 06:43 UTC
1 
 
Evolution of mindsight, transparency and rule-rationality 
 
Dimitry Rtischev 
Faculty of Economics 
Gakushuin University 
Tokyo, Japan 
 
Working Paper 
Revised August 10, 2012 
 
Abstract   Evolution of preferences models often assume that all agents display and 
observe preferences costlessly.  Instead, we endogenize mindsight (to observe preferences) 
and transparency (to show preferences) as slightly costly mechanisms that agents may or 
may not possess.  Unlike in the costless models, we show that universal rule-rationality, 
mindsight and transparency do not constitute an equilibrium but universal act-rationality, 
mind-blindness, and opaqueness do.  We also find that rule-rationality, mindsight, and 
transparency may exist in evolved populations, albeit only in a portion of the population 
whose size fluctuates along an orbit around a focal point.  We apply our results to 
Ultimatum and Trust games to explore how costly and optional mindsight may affect 
economic performance in interactions among evolved agents. 
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1. Introduction 
Most game theory models do not explicitly inquire into the origins of their players.  
The tacit assumption is that players are creatures of the moment, created out of nothing just 
to earn the most from playing the game once and then disappear without consequences.  By 
construction, such momentary agents are act-rational in the sense that each player (i) 
always chooses the action that maximizes his payoff and (ii) assumes that other players also 
always choose their actions to maximize their payoffs.  In the case of the Ultimatum game 
to divide a resource between a proposer and a responder, a responder who obeys (i) accepts 
any offer of one cent or more and a proposer who obeys (i) and (ii) offers one cent.  But 
experiments reveal that human subjects usually do not play this way: most proposers make 
substantial offers and many responders refuse small offers. (Oosterbeek 2004)  Evidently 
many human responders do not obey (i) and most human proposers not obey (i) and/or (ii).  
Experimental economics has documented such gaps between theoretical equilibria and 
experimental play in a variety of games.  But considering the different origins of 
momentary agents and human subjects, the gap in how they play should not surprise.  Even 
anonymous strangers who interact only once in a carefully staged experiment are a product 
of a long process of evolution.  According to evolutionary psychology, humans evolved 
under selection pressure favoring the ability to make psychological commitments and 
perceive or infer psychological commitments of others. (Nesse 2001)  In particular, 
evolutionary psychologists stress that human interactions are fundamentally mediated by 
theory of mind, by subjective commitments secured with emotions not under voluntary 
control, and by other psychological capabilities refined through selection in social contexts.  
(Nesse 2001)  At the level of the brain, interpersonal neurobiology emphasizes the role of 
“mindsight,” the ability to form and make use of mental representations of how a human 
(oneself or another) thinks and feels in the midst of an interaction.  (Siegel 2001)   
A branch of game theory that has gone beyond momentary agents in the direction 
pointed by evolutionary psychology is evolution of preferences theory, first formulated as 
the indirect evolutionary approach by Guth and Yaari (1992).  Treating agents’ decision-
making as an endogenous capability subject to evolutionary selection, the theory shows that 
selection on the basis of relative performance in a strategic interaction yields agents who 
are committed to pursue a “subjective utility” different from the payoffs they actually earn 
in the interaction. (Banerjee and Weibull 1995; Guth and Peleg 2001)  Asking “What to 
maximize if you must?” in a generic game, Heifetz, et. al. (2007) formally and broadly 
demonstrated that strategic interaction inherently generates the incentive to commit to 
maximize something other than the objective payoffs, and that such commitments do not 
disappear under evolutionary dynamics.  In a similar vein, Aumann (2008) informally 
argues that evolution favors rule-rational agents committed to an optimal rule of behavior 
over act-rational agents who optimize one act at a time.  
3 
 
All this ultimately rests on Schelling’s (1960) insight that if players can make 
commitments they often find it advantageous to do so, and often the commitments 
drastically change how a game is played.  Since momentary agents in simple games are 
denied the ability to make commitments, they are act-rational by construction.  Since agents 
in evolution of preferences models are allowed to make commitments, in equilibrium all 
agents are committed to rule-rational preferences.  But this finding of universal rule-
rationality among evolved agents critically depends on the assumption that the agents can 
costlessly display and observe preferences.  Attempts to relax this assumption have mostly 
relied on noisy signaling to model how agents get information about the preferences of 
other agents.  (Guth and Kliemt, 1998 and 2000;  Heifetz, et. al., 2007)  Instead of 
stochastically degrading the communication of preferences among agents, we endogenize it 
by making such communication slightly costly and optional.  Specifically, we allow agents 
to be opaque or transparent, blind or with mindsight, in the following sense:  an agent with 
mindsight observes the preferences of a transparent agent, a blind agent cannot observe 
another’s preferences, and the preferences of an opaque agent are not observable by anyone.   
Because mindsight and transparency are slightly costly in our model, the rule-
rational population in which all agents are transparent and have mindsight can be invaded 
by blind and opaque agents.  Reversing the findings of the costless evolution of preferences 
models, we show that universal rule-rationality is not an equilibrium but universal act-
rationality is.  However, we also find that there exists a focal point surrounded by closed 
orbits along which rule-rational transparent agents and agents with mindsight may exist in 
in the long-run and in significant proportions.  We apply our results to Ultimatum and Trust 
games to explore how economic performance in evolved populations is affected by rule-
rationality, mindsight, and transparency. 
The distinction between rule-rationality and act-rationality has been long noted by 
philosophers of rationality and morality, albeit using different terminology. (Gauthier, 1986, 
Chapter VI)  Of particular relevance to our model is Danielson’s (1990) pioneering book 
which explicitly considers mindsight and transparency among strategically interacting 
agents.  Attempting to algorithmically examine Gauthier’s (1986) theory of rational 
morality, Danielson conceives agents as logic programs that may examine other agents’ 
programs and may allow themselves to be examined by others’ programs.  Like Danielson, 
we assume each agent operates according to its own built-in “decision logic” and allow 
some agents to display and observe these decision logics.  Unlike Danielson, we assume 
that the display and observation of decision logics are costly and focus on evolutionary 
population dynamics. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section lays out the formal 
framework.  Section 3 presents results of equilibrium analysis.  We then explore our 
findings in the context of the Ultimatum Game (Section 4) and the Trust Game (Section 5).   
Section 6 concludes.  
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2. The model 
There are two separate populations of agents:  “leaders” and “responders.”  A dyad 
is formed by randomly drawing one agent from each population.  The state of the 
environment (e.g., weather) that prevails when the dyad interacts is expressed by random 
variable e, which is drawn every time a dyad is formed.1  Each dyad plays a base game as 
follows:  first both players observe e, then the leader observes the responder and takes 
action x, and finally the responder observes x and takes action y.  The resulting payoffs are 
),,(1 eyx  to the leader and ),,(2 eyx  to the responder.  When a dyad is formed, the leader 
is endowed with 01 and the responder with 02 .  If at least one player abstains from the 
game, both players keep these endowments. 
We make the following assumptions about the cognitive structures and processes 
that agents use to choose actions.  
Definition   Decision logic is a deterministic function, algorithm, or program within an 
agent that computes the action the agent takes whenever he plays.  
Assumption   Each responder has a decision logic whose inputs are the leader’s action and 
the state of the environment: ),( exy i . 
Definition Theory of mind is what a leader believes to be the decision logic of a responder 
in his dyad.  
Assumption   Each leader has a decision logic whose inputs are a theory of mind and the 
state of the environment: ),( ex i .  
Assumption Each leader’s decision logic maximizes the payoff given the theory of mind:  
)),,(,(maxarg),( 1 eexxe x   . 
Every leader is one of two psychological types: either blind (type B) or with 
mindsight (type M).  Every responder is one of two psychological types: either transparent 
(type T) or opaque (type O).   We define these properties as follows. 
Definition  The decision logic of a leader with mindsight takes as input the decision logic of 
a transparent responder.   
                                                 
1 Although e does not play a direct role in the analysis, it is necessary to assume a changing environment in 
order to ensure that agents dynamically compute their actions rather than being hardwired.  
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Definition  The decision logic of a transparent responder is taken as input by the decision 
logic of every leader with mindsight.    
Definition  The decision logic of a blind leader cannot take as input the decision logic of 
any responder. 
Definition The decision logic of an opaque responder cannot be taken as input by any 
leader. 
In terms of psychological traits, there are four possible types of dyads:  MT, MO, 
BT, and BO.  In the MO, BT, and BO dyads, the leader cannot observe responder’s 
decision logic and therefore the leader’s decision logic relies on a built-in theory of mind 
 which may or may not be accurate.  Only in the MT dyad the leader observes the 
responder’s decision logic and uses it as the theory of mind.2 
The type of responder is given by ),(  , where },{ OT  indicates transparency 
or opaqueness and   is the decision logic; that is ),( exy  .  Displaying one’s decision 
logic is a costly capability – a transparent responder incurs a cost 0  every time he plays.  
Many types of opaque and transparent responders may exist, differing in terms of their 
decision logic.  The state of responder population is given by the population share vector3 
),...,,,...,( 11 TOOO qqqq q , where ]1,0[iq is the share of the ith type of responder ),( ii  , 
O is the number of opaque responder types, T is the number of transparent responder types, 
and 1 iq . 
The type of leader is specified by ),(  , where },{ MB indicates blindness or 
mindsight and   is the theory of mind.  Mindsight is a costly capability – a leader with 
mindsight incurs a cost μ > 0 every time he plays.  Many types of blind leaders and leaders 
with mindsight may exist, differing in terms of their decision logic.  The state of leader 
population is given by the population share vector ),...,,,...,( 11 MBBB pppp p , where 
]1,0[ip  is the share of the ith type of leader ),( ii  , B is the number of blind leader types, 
M is the number of leader types with mindsight, and 1 ip .    
    The payoffs earned in each of the four dyads are as follows4: 
Blind-Opaque dyad:  (leader type i = 1,…,B; responder type j = 1,…,O) 
)))((),((1 iji
BO
ij    to the leader 
                                                 
2 In general, the leader in the MT dyad could ignore the input and use an incorrect theory of mind.  As proven 
in Proposition 2, doing so cannot increase the leader’s payoff in the dyad.  
3 Population share vectors q and p are column vectors. 
4 For notational clarity, we omit the environment parameter e in most expressions hereinafter. 
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)))((),((2 iji
OB
ij    to the responder 
Blind-Transparent dyad: (i = 1,…,B;  j = O+1,…,O+T) 
)))((),((1 iji
BT
ij    to the leader  
  )))((),((2 ijiTBij  to the responder 
Mindsight-Opaque dyad:  (i = B+1,…,B+M;  j = 1,…,O) 
  )))((),((1 ijiMOij  to the leader  
)))((),((2 iji
OM
ij    to the responder 
Mindsight-Transparent dyad:  (i = B+1,…,B+M;  j = O+1,…,O+T) 
  )))((),((1 jjjMTij  to the leader  
  )))((),((2 jjjTMij  to the responder 
 
The leaders’ payoff matrix has B+M rows and O+T columns arranged as follows: 


 MTMO
BTBO
L ΠΠ
ΠΠΠ  
where  ][ BOij
BO Π  is the B-row O-column matrix of leader payoffs in blind-opaque 
dyads, BTΠ  is the B-row T-column matrix of leader payoffs in blind-transparent dyads, 
MOΠ  is the M-row O-column matrix of leader payoffs in mindsight-opaque dyads, and 
MTΠ  is the M-row T-column matrix of leader payoffs in mindsight-transparent dyads.   
Analogously, the responders’ payoff matrix has B+M rows and O+T columns 
arranged as follows: 


 TMOM
TBOB
R ΠΠ
ΠΠΠ  
The evolutionary dynamics occur as follows.  During each generation many random 
dyads are formed to play the base game.  Each type of leader (responder) accumulates 
fitness equal to the sum of the payoffs earned by that type of leader (responder) in the base 
game.  At the end of a generation agents replicate and die.  Replication occurs within the 
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leader and responder populations separately.  The replication is governed by a standard 
replicator dynamic.  Specifically, the share of a given type of leader (responder) in the new 
population of leaders (responders) equals the fitness share earned by that type of leader 
(responder) in the old population, computed as the share of the total fitness earned by all 
leaders (responders) in the old generation.  Many generations ensue.   
The expected fitness of each leader type given the state of the responder population 
is given by the expected fitness vector qΠV LL  .  The population average fitness of 
leaders is LLV Vp  .  Analogously, the expected fitness of each responder type given the 
state of the leader population is pΠV RR ˆ , where RΠˆ  is the transpose of RΠ .   The 
population average fitness of responders is RRV Vq  .  The replicator dynamic is: 
Leaders:   MBiVVpp L
L
iii  ,...,1),(  
Responders:   TOjVVqq R
R
jjj  ,...,1),(  
 
Definition  A fixed point is a population state of leaders and responders (p,q) that satisfies 
the following conditions for all i = 1,…, B+M and j = 1,…, O+T: 
(i) 0 iLLi pifVV  
(ii) ,0 jRRj qifVV  
(iii) 0 iLLi pifVV  
(iv) 0 jRRj qifVV  
 
In our framework there are two populations of agents, each playing a different role 
in an asymmetric base game.  As is commonly done in evolutionary game theory models, 
we could have introduced a stage in which role assignment is randomly determined before 
play in each dyad.  This would have made the base game symmetric and allowed all the 
players to belong to a single population.  The benefit of our approach is that it retains 
separate focus on mindsight and transparency, which are inherently asymmetric capabilities 
for receiving and transmitting information about preferences. 
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3. Equilibrium analysis 
Although the space of possible decision logics is very large, two decision logics 
play a central role in equilibrium analysis.  Following Aumann (2008), we will refer to 
them as act-rationality and rule-rationality.  
Definition  An act-rational responder has decision logic ),,(maxarg),( 2 eyxexA y   . 
Definition  A rule-rational responder has decision logic R(x, e) such that   
))),((),(())),((),((.. 22 eRRReRRRtsRe     and 
)),(,()),(,(..)( 11 exRxexRxtsRRxe    
Decision logic A is the responder’s best response whereas decision logic R is the 
responder’s best strategic commitment.  The first condition in the definition of R ensures 
that no other decision logic yields the responder a higher payoff.  The second condition 
ensures R “punishes” as much as possible a leader who does not maximize own payoff by 
taking into account the leader’s commitment to R.   
As a shorthand, we will denote the leader’s payoff-maximizing strategy given the 
decision logic of the responder as follows: 
))(,(maxarg)( 1 xAxAx xA   
))(,(maxarg)( 1 xRxRx xR   
We will also use the following shorthand notation to denote base game payoffs to 
leaders (i=1) and responders (i=2), gross of the costs of mindsight and transparency: 
))(,(
))(,(
))(,(
))(,(
AAi
AR
i
RRi
RA
i
AAi
AA
i
RRi
RR
i
xRx
xAx
xAx
xRx








 
We confine attention to base games in which strategic commitment affects payoffs.    
This class of games is large and can be formally described as in Heifetz, et. al. (2007).  For 
our purposes, it suffices to assume the following about the payoff structure of the base 
game: 
Assumption 1   The base game is such that xA, and xR are uniquely defined and satisfy the 
following: 
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exx RA    
 ei
AA
i  0     (participation constraint under act-rationality) 
ei
RR
i  0     (participation constraint under rule-rationality) 
 
We also assume that the costs of mindsight and transparency are not too large 
relative to their effect on payoffs in the base game.  Specifically: 
Assumption 2     For a responder facing a leader with mindsight, the cost of transparency is 
less than the benefit of strategic commitment: 
                                                   eAARR  22   
Assumption 3    For a leader facing a rule-rational transparent responder, the cost of 
mindsight is less than the benefit of heeding the responder’s strategic commitment: 
                                                   eARRR  11   
 
The following propositions characterize fixed point populations.  All the proofs are 
in the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 1   At a fixed point, every opaque responder is act-rational. 
 
Proposition 2   At a fixed point, every leader with mindsight uses the transparent 
responder’s decision logic as the theory of mind and believes that an opaque responder is 
act-rational.  That is, a leader with mindsight in a dyad with a responder of type ),(  has 
the theory of mind:  




OifA
TifM


 
 
Proposition 3   The only monomorphic population that is a fixed point is:  all responders 
are opaque and act-rational, all leaders are blind and hold act-rationality as the theory of 
mind.  Moreover, this is a stable fixed point. 
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Proposition 4   A population in which all leaders have mindsight is not a fixed point. 
 
Proposition 5   A population in which all responders are transparent and have the same 
decision logic is not a fixed point. 
 
Proposition 6   If the cost of mindsight is sufficiently small, there exists a unique fixed 
point at which a share )1,0(*m of leaders have mindsight, a share )1,0(*t  of responders 
are transparent, all blind leaders believe responders are rule-rational, and all transparent 
responders are rule-rational.  This fixed point is given by 
RAAA
RARR
m
22
22* 



         
RAAAt
11
1* 

  
Moreover, (m*, t*) is an evolutionary focal point around which all trajectories are closed 
orbits with the time frequencies of (m, t) along the orbits equal to (m*, t*).   
 
Proposition 7   There exists a unique unstable fixed point at which a fraction )1,0(*m of 
leaders have mindsight, a fraction )1,0(*t  of responders are transparent, all blind leaders 
believe responders are act-rational, and all transparent responders are rule-rational.    
 
The foregoing propositions identify combinations of psychological traits and 
decision logics that may evolve among agents subject to selection based on their 
performance in a sequential dyadic interaction.  The only monomorphic evolutionarily 
stable state is universal blindness, opaqueness, and act-rationality.   Blind leaders and 
opaque responders cannot go extinct.  Opaque responders are act-rational.  Although 
neither a blind leader nor a leader with mindsight can see the decision logic of an opaque 
responder, the leader with mindsight has an advantage when paired with an opaque 
responder because by seeing opaqueness he can infer that the responder is act-rational.  
Although mindsight, transparency, and rule-rationality cannot be universal and cannot be 
present in asymptotically stable proportions, they may nevertheless be present in an 
evolved population along closed orbits around a focal point.  In such populations, blind 
leaders assume that responders are rule-rational and leaders with mindsight assume that 
opaque responders are act-rational.    
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4. Ultimatum island 
Imagine an island populated by two species: pushers and pullers.  Every minute, a 
random pusher finds a resource of value e and a random puller appears nearby.  To extract 
the resource they must cooperate:  the pusher must push while the puller pulls.  The pusher 
offers to give x to the puller after they extract the resource, where   ex0  and ε 
is the minimum amount that can be allocated to an agent.5  The puller accepts or rejects the 
offer.  If the puller rejects, the agents go their separate ways and the resource rots away.  If 
the puller accepts, the agents cooperate to extract and divide the resource.  There are no 
endowments that agents can keep by abstaining from the game:  002
0
1   .  The pusher 
and puller payoff functions are, respectively  




rejectyif
acceptyifxe
yx
0
),(1        



rejectyif
acceptyifx
yx
0
),(2  
Under ideal institutions that costlessly ensure cooperation in all dyads, realized product is  
P = e.  This is the first-best baseline.   We ask: What kind of rationality may evolve on this 
island? 
The decision logic of an act-rational puller is:  



 

xifreject
xifaccept
xA )(  
The decision logic of a rule-rational puller is: 



 

exifreject
exifaccept
xR )(  
Pusher strategies are: Ax  and  exR .  The payoffs under the various combinations 
of decision logics are:  








RA
AR
RR
AA e
1
1
1
1
0
      








e
e
RA
AR
RR
AA
2
2
2
2
0
 
By Proposition 3, the blind/opaque/act-rational population in which all pushers are 
(B, A) and all pullers are (O, A) is evolutionarily stable.   
                                                 
5 To avoid weak inequalities, we assume that when cooperating each agent incurs a small cost and therefore 
agents make and accept only those offers which give both parties a strictly positive gain of at least ε. 
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By Proposition 6, the following population is an evolutionary focal point:  
Pushers:  (B, R) and (M, ΦM)    Population shares: 



2
,
2
1  emeb  
Pullers:  (O, A) and (T, R)    Population shares:  



2
1,
2  eteo   
           provided 
 

e
e )2(
 
and   2 e  
 
 Table 1 presents a numerical example comparing economic performance in the 
monomorphic population and at the bimorphic focal point.   In the monomorphic 
equilibrium all pushers offer the minimum and pullers always accept.  There is no 
mindsight among pushers or transparency among pullers.  All pullers are act-rational and 
all pushers believe that all pullers are act-rational.  Mindsight, transparency and rule-
rationality exist along closed orbits around the bimorphic focal point.  In these populations 
too offers are never rejected since blind pushers believe that pullers are rule-rational and 
offer almost everything.  The total product realized is only τ less than in the monomorphic 
equilibrium, but is allocated almost entirely to the pullers.  Mindsight and transparency thus 
serve to reverse the allocation in favor of pullers. 
<Table 1 about here> 
Without mindsight pushers exploit the act-rational pullers and this is a stable 
equilibrium.  Since mindsight and transparency enable pullers to turn the tables and exploit 
the pushers, it can be said that pullers prefer to display their rule-rational decision logic but 
pushers prefer not to look.   Yet even though mindsight hurts them, pushers with mindsight 
can be present in an evolved population.  Although mindsight hurts pushers, because it is 
locally adaptive it does not go extinct.  As the numerical example shows, even a small 
fraction of pushers with mindsight may be enough to support transparency and rule-
rationality among almost all pullers, and make the blind pushers adopt rule-rationality as 
their theory of the puller’s mind.   
According to experimental evidence compiled across numerous ultimatum 
experiments conducted in different cultures, on average, human proposers offer 40% of the 
pie and human responders reject 16% of offers. (Oosterbeek 2004)   Although our simple 
model cannot explain this data, it points to the possibility that a more refined model of 
mindsight, transparency and evolutionary commitment to rule-rationality may be able to 
help account for this evidence. 
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5. Trust island 
An island is populated by two species: getters and workers.  Every minute a random 
getter obtains a resource of value e > 0.  The getter can “invest” some portion  ],0[ ex  of 
the resource to be worked on by a random worker who is nearby.   The worker’s effort 
multiplies the value of the investment by a factor of k > 1.  After finishing the work, the 
worker can pay back any amount ],0[ kxy  to the getter.  The resulting payoffs are 
yxeyx ),(1  to the getter and ykxyx ),(2  to the worker.  The endowments in 
each dyad are:  e01    and 002  .  Under ideal institutions that costlessly ensure 
maximal investment in all dyads, the product realized is  P = ke.  This is the first-best 
baseline.  We want to know:  What kind of rationality may evolve on this island? 
The decision logic of an act-rational worker never returns anything to the getter:  
0),( exA  
The decision logic of a rule-rational worker minimally rewards those getters who invest 
everything and punishes all others: 




exif
exife
exR
0
),(

 
Getter strategies are: 0Ax  and exR  . The payoffs under the various 
combinations of decision logics are:  
01
1
1
1




RA
AR
RR
AA
e
e
e




      
ke
eke
RA
AR
RR
AA




2
2
2
2
0
0




 
By Proposition 3, the blind / opaque / act-rational population in which all getters are 
(B, A) and all workers are (O, A) is evolutionarily stable.   
By Proposition 6, the following population is an evolutionary focal point:  
Getters:  (B, R) and (M, ΦM)    Population shares: 
ke
em
ke
eb   ,1  
Workers:  (O, A) and (T, R)    Population shares:  
e
t
e
o   1,  
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           provided 
  e
e
 
and    )1(ke  
 
Table 2 gives a numerical example comparing economic performance in the 
monomorphic population and at the bimorphic focal point.  In the monomorphic 
equilibrium getters do not invest anything and the workers earn nothing.  In orbits around 
the bimorphic focal point, blind getters believe that workers are committed to repay with 
interest and invest everything.  Some of them are betrayed by act-rational workers.  But 
investment occurs in most dyads, the only exception being dyads in which a getter with 
mindsight is paired with an opaque act-rational worker.  Mindsight and transparency serve 
to increase the average product but also allocate most of the gains to the workers.  However, 
average fitness of both getters and workers is higher near the bimorphic focal point than in 
the monomorphic population. 
<Table 2 about here> 
This case shows that mindsight, transparency and rule-rationality can be critical for 
trust, can make all players better off on average, and may exist in evolved populations.  
Unlike in the Ultimatum Game, mindsight and transparency are incentive-compatible for 
all: it can be said workers want to show their decision logic and getters want to see it.  But 
since mindsight is costly, a fraction of getters evolves to free-ride without mindsight.  Such 
blind trusting getters in turn create a niche for opaque act-rational workers, who evolve to 
prey on them.  However, as the numerical example in Table 2 shows, distrust, betrayal, 
opaqueness and act-rationality can all be very rare even if only a minority of the getters 
have mindsight.   
 
 
6. Conclusion 
We studied the decision logics and the capabilities for showing and observing them 
which may evolve among randomly paired agents subject to selection based on their 
performance in a strategic interaction.  We found if mindsight and transparency are costly 
and optional, universal blindness, opaqueness, and act-rationality constitute the only 
evolutionarily stable equilibrium.  We also found that blind leaders and opaque responders 
cannot go extinct and opaque responders must be act-rational.  We showed that mindsight, 
transparency, and rule-rationality cannot be maintained in the entire population, nor can 
they be maintained in an asymptotically stable share of the population.   
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However, we also demonstrated that the evolution of mindsight, transparency, and 
rule-rationality cannot be ruled out.  Mindsight, transparency, and rule-rationality may be 
found in a significant share of the population, a share that fluctuates along a closed orbit 
around a focal point.  In such populations, blind leaders assume every responder is rule-
rational and leaders with mindsight assume that an opaque responder is act-rational.   
We applied our general findings to two specific contexts: Ultimatum Game and 
Trust Game.   In both games, mindsight, transparency, and rule-rationality serve to allocate 
most of the surplus to responders.  Given the zero-sum nature of the Ultimatum Game, 
mindsight does not engender new value and leaders are better off in the equilibrium without 
mindsight.  But in the Trust Game, both leaders and responders earn more in populations 
with mindsight and mindsight, transparency, and rule-rationality are essential for enabling 
the investment that generates the new value.   
On stability and complexity grounds, we conclude that act-rationality, blindness, 
and opaqueness are more likely to be found in a population of evolved agents than rule-
rationality, mindsight, and transparency.  However, we also conclude that the evolution of 
rule-rationality, mindsight, and transparency is possible.  Committing to, displaying, 
observing and inferring preferences constitutes an important dimension along which 
strategically interacting agents may evolve.  Further work on this dimension of evolution 
may shed light on the complex psychology and behavior revealed in game experiments.  
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Appendix  
 
Definition.  Decision logics   and   are different  (denoted by   ) if   
),(),( exex   except at a countable set of points ),( ex   where ),(),( exex   
 
Proof  of Proposition 1  Suppose that in the population of responders there are some 
opaque agents with act-rational decision logic A and some opaque agents with a different 
decision logic AZ  .  Since a leader facing an opaque responder in a dyad cannot see 
whether the responder has A or Z, the leader’s action is the same against either type of 
responder.  By definition of act-rationality, replying to the leader’s action using A yields the 
responder a higher payoff than replying using Z.  Thus opaque Z-responders earn lower 
average fitness than opaque A-responders.  Therefore the assumed population is not a fixed 
point.  Next suppose that all opaque responders are act-rational.  A mutant opaque 
responder with decision logic Z has a lower fitness and therefore cannot invade.  ■ 
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Proof of Proposition 2   When a leader with mindsight is paired with an opaque responder, 
he sees that the responder is opaque and uses some theory of mind.  Suppose some leaders 
use A and some leaders use AZ   as the theory of mind for opaque responders. Since, at a 
fixed point all opaque responders are act-rational (Proposition 1), the leader who uses A 
earns a higher payoff than the leader who uses Z.  Thus the two types of leader cannot 
coexist at a fixed point.  Furthermore, if all leaders with mindsight use A for opaque 
responders, a mutant leader using Z for opaque responders cannot invade.   
When a leader with mindsight meets a transparent responder with decision logic   , he can 
use it as the theory of mind or may use a different theory Z  .  Using Z yields the leader 
a lower payoff, and thus lower fitness, than using  .  Thus the two types of leader cannot 
coexist at a fixed point.  Furthermore, if all leaders with mindsight use   for transparent 
responders, a mutant leader using Z for transparent responders cannot invade.■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3   Suppose all leaders are of type (B, A) and all responders are of 
type (O, A).  Since all responders are opaque, a mutant leader with mindsight can get no 
information but would incur the cost of mindsight.  Since all responders are act-rational, a 
mutant leader with a different theory of mind would earn less fitness.  Thus mutants with 
mindsight or different theory of mind cannot invade the leader population.  Since all leaders 
are blind, a mutant responder who is transparent cannot influence any leader’s action, but 
would incur the cost of transparency.  A mutant responder who is not act-rational would 
earn less fitness than an act-rational responder.  Thus mutant responders who are 
transparent or have a different decision logic cannot invade the responder population.  That 
other possible monomorphic populations are not fixed points is proved as Propositions 4 
and 5. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4   Suppose all leaders have mindsight.  By Proposition 2, if this is a 
fixed point then all leaders have theory of mind M .  From the definition of R it follows 
that, when playing against a population of (M, M ) leaders, a (T, R) responder would earn 
higher fitness than a (T, Z) responder for any AZ  .  Assumption 2 implies that a (T, R) 
responder would earn higher fitness than a (O, A) responder.  By Proposition 1, an (O, A) 
responder would earn higher fitness than a (O, Z) responder for any AZ  .  Thus, if all 
leaders have mindsight and the population is a fixed point, then all responders must be (T, 
R).  A mutant (B, R) leader would earn the same payoff as a (M, M ) leader but save the 
cost of mindsight.  Thus a mutant blind leader can invade the leader population. ■ 
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Proof of Proposition 5   Suppose there is a fixed point at which all responders are of type 
(T, Θ).  A blind (B, Θ) leader would play the same as a (M, M ) leader, but save the cost 
of mindsight.  Thus the leader population must consist entirely (B, Θ) agents.  A mutant (O, 
A) responder can earn more against such leaders than a (T, Θ) responder.   Therefore a 
mutant opaque act-rational responder can invade.  ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 6   Consider a population of leaders consisting of (B, R) and (M, ΦM) 
types and a population of responders consisting of (O, A) and (T, R) types.  The system is 
an asymmetric evolutionary game analyzed by Gintis (2009, Sec. 12.17).  We follow his 
approach to solve for the fixed point and ascertain its stability.   
Let b be the share of blind leaders, m the share of leaders with mindsight, o the share of 
opaque responders, and t the share of transparent responders.  The leader population is 
given by ),( mbp , where  b + m =  1 and  ]1,0[, mb .  The responder population is given 
by ),( toq , where  o + t = 1 and  ]1,0[, to .  The payoff matrices are: 
Leaders:     


 

RRAA
RRRA
L
11
11Π       
Responders:      



 

RRAA
RRRA
R
22
22Π  
Adding a constant to each entry in a column of  LΠ  or in a row of RΠ  does not affect the 
replicator dynamics.  Therefore we can simplify the payoff matrices as follows: 





0
0
11 

RAAALΠ          
 




0
0
22
22


RRAA
RARR
RΠ  
Using the population share of blind leaders b and population share of opaque responders o 
as state variables, we can express the replicator equations of the two populations as follows: 
))(1(
))(1(
oooo
bbbb






 
where 
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RAAA
RAAA
RRAA
22
11
22 0
0








 
The fixed point is given by: 
RAAA
RRAA
b
22
22* 




      ,   RAAAo
11
* 



  
and m* = 1 – b* and t* = 1 – o*.  Since α and β have opposite signs, this population is an 
evolutionary focal point surrounded by trajectories which are closed orbits such that the 
time frequencies of (b, o) along the orbits equal (b*, o*).   (Gintis, 2009, Theorem 12.9) 
Next, we need to establish that a third type of responder cannot invade the bimorphic 
responder population consisting of (O, A) and (T, R) types.  By Proposition 1, a mutant of 
type (O, Z≠A) cannot invade.  A mutant of type (T, A) also cannot invade because it is 
treated the same as (O, A) responder by both types of leader and therefore earns τ less 
fitness than (O, A) responder.  Lastly, consider a mutant responder of type (T, Z) such that 
Z≠R and Z≠A.  Since R is the decision logic that induces the leader with mindsight to 
take the action which lets the responder maximize its payoff, the mutant earns less than the 
incumbent (T, R) responder earns against (B, R) or (M, ΦM) leader.     
Finally, we need to establish that a third type of leader cannot invade the bimorphic leader 
population consisting of (B, R) and (M, ΦM) types.  By Proposition 2, a leader with 
mindsight but with a theory of mind different from ΦM cannot invade.   So we only need to 
consider a mutant blind leader with decision logic Z≠R.  The expected fitness of such (B, 
Z) leader is ZRZABZ toV 11   .  The expected fitness of incumbent (M, ΦM) is 
  RRAAM toV 11  .   The mutant cannot invade if MBZ VV  , which reduces to  
)()( 1111
ZRRRZAAA to   . 
By definition of A, ZAAA 11   .  By definition of R, ZRRR 11   .  Therefore, the upper bound 
on   is positive and for any Z there exists a sufficiently small positive   such that (B, Z) 
cannot invade.    ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 7   The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 6.  The 
difference lies in the fitness earned by blind leaders and by responders paired with blind 
leaders.    Consider a population of leaders consisting of (B, A) and (M, ΦM) types and a 
20 
 
population of responders consisting of (O, A) and (T, R) types.   The key parameters of the 
replicator dynamic are: 
RRAR
RRAR
RRAA
RRAR
22
11
22
11
0
0








 
The fixed point is given by: 
RRAR
RRAA
b
22
22* 




      ,   RRAR
RRAR
o
11
11* 




  
Since α and β have the same sign, (b*, o*) is a saddle point and therefore unstable.  (Gintis, 
2009, Theorem 12.9)  ■ 
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Table 1  Economic performance in the Ultimatum game in the monomorphic equilibrium 
consisting solely of act-rational agents without mindsight or transparency, and at the 
bimorphic focal point where act- and rule-rational agents coexist.  
 
Base game: Ultimatum  e=100, ε=5, μ=2, τ=1 
      Monomorphic  Bimorphic  
Population          
Leaders (pushers)          
Blind  (B, A)  a  1  0 
Blind  (B, R)  b  0  0.989 
Mindsight (M, ΦM)  m  0  0.011 
Responders (pullers)          
Opaque act‐rational  (O, A)  o  1  0.022 
Transparent rule‐rational  (T, R)  t  0  0.978 
           
Performance          
Leader average fitness  VL  95  5 
Responder average fitness  VR  5  94 
Total product realized  P=VL+VR 100  99 
First‐best product possible  e  100  100 
Fraction of first‐best realized  P/e  1  0.99 
Leader share of product  VL/P  0.95  0.05 
Responder share of product  VR/P  0.05  0.95 
Fraction of dyads with rejected offers  a t  0  0 
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Table 2  Economic performance in the Trust game in the monomorphic equilibrium 
consisting solely of act-rational agents without mindsight or transparency, and at the 
bimorphic focal point where act- and rule-rational agents coexist. 
 
Base game: Trust  e=100, ε=5, μ=2, τ=1, k=5 
      Monomorphic  Bimorphic  
Population          
Leaders (getters)          
Blind  (B, A)  a  1  0 
Blind  (B, R)  b  0  0.788 
Mindsight (M, ΦM)  m  0  0.212 
Responders (workers)          
Opaque act‐rational  (O, A)  o  1  0.02 
Transparent rule‐rational  (T, R)  t  0  0.98 
           
Performance          
Leader average fitness  VL  100  102.9 
Responder average fitness  VR  0  394 
Total product realized  P=VL+VR 100  496.9 
First‐best product possible  k e  500  500 
Fraction of first‐best realized  P/(ke)  0.2  0.9938 
Leader share of product  VL/P  1  0.21 
Responder share of product  VR/P  0  0.79 
Fraction of dyads with reciprocated trust (b+m)t 0  0.98 
Fraction of dyads with distrust  a + m o 1  0.00424 
Fraction of dyads with betrayal  b o  0  0.01576 
 
 
